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Russian Federation: Executive Branch and Military 
Reform 
By Susan Cavan 
 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
Aftereffects of Kremlin reform 
The much-discussed Kozak reforms of the state bureaucracy have had only a 
minor impact on the Kremlin administration. Despite promises and predictions, 
(see previous NIS Observed) the cold numbers of reform data belie the 
expectations of bureaucratic contraction: the number of directorates in the 
presidential administration has decreased from 20 to 17 and the "total number of 
staff" has been reduced "from 1,500 to 1,200." (1) Doubts remain, of course, 
about the definition of "total number of staff." 
 
The shifting of titles among Kremlin elite, from deputy directors of the 
administration to presidential aides for example, would have carried more 
significance if the reform were not applied across the board but selectively. While 
there has been a significant redistribution of portfolios among the top Kremlin 
figures, this reform suggests less of an attempt to circumvent opportunities for 
corruption than an effort to change the system established by former Kremlin 
Chief Aleksandr Voloshin. Dmitri Medvedev, as current Chief, has expanded his 
reach to include not only presidential envoys, protocol, and the control and legal 
affairs directorates, but the Prosecutor’s office and Supreme Court as well. On 
the surface, this would appear as a challenge to Dmitri Kozak, who cut his 
Kremlin teeth on judicial reform. Kozak, however, retains oversight of the power 
organs, state and regional reforms, and his entire government portfolio. (2) 
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As always, duplication, and potential overlap of authority continues to plague 
Kremlin operations, leaving the effect of personality to drive the power of 
positions. 
 
Reform at the White House 
On the government side of the Kozak reform plan, it appears as though even less 
has been accomplished, and, once again, the effect of reform is best measured 
by comparing the relative gains and losses of the main players. 
 
While the number of ministries has been reduced from 23 to 15, the number of 
departments has surged from 56 to 80. (3) The decrease in the number of 
ministries was intended to concentrate authority in the hands of the ministers 
heading newly combined sectors of governmental responsibility. Fewer but 
stronger ministers, who are not dependent on the prime minister, would serve to 
weaken the premier’s position relative to the president and the Kremlin side of 
the executive branch. In practice however, Prime Minister Fradkov has managed 
to strengthen his position as Premier by increasing the number of departments 
within his personal purview to eight, and more importantly, obtaining the nuclear 
power and natural monopolies portfolios under the guise of prime ministerial 
departments. (4) (Fradkov’s move on the nuclear industry may have been 
countered already, in part at least, by the defense ministry. See the Military 
Reform section below.) For Prime Minister Fradkov, any move to strengthen 
departments, or state agencies and services for that matter, wins him a greater 
degree of autonomy as he retains appointment prerogatives over their 
leadership, as opposed to that of the ministries. 
 
Despite initial impressions of the reform, some of the ministers, such as Viktor 
Khristenko, have managed to retain their influence even with overt demotions, by 
gaining the Prime Minister’s confidence and therefore oversight functions over 
crucial government sectors. While the ministries theoretically have the right to 
submit draft laws to the Federal Assembly, the Prime Minister, in some 
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instances, has added a supervisory layer directed from his office, to curtail some 
ministerial independence. Other ministers, German Gref for example, appeared 
to wield significant influence according to the initial reform, but in fact, has seen 
his Ministry of Economic Development and Trade pecked away, in part by the 
aforementioned Khristenko. (5) 
 
Of greater concern in the overall reform effort is the increased role the executive 
branch as a whole is playing in the legislative process. Without a viable 
opposition in the Duma, executive draft laws can expect little interference from 
legislators as the bills make their way toward full legal status. 
 
MILITARY REFORM 
Military-technical commission membership 
President Putin will chair the Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation with 
Foreign States, with Prime Minister Fradkov serving as Deputy Chairman. The 
other members are Boris Alyoshin, Director of the Federal Agency for Industry; 
Mikhail Dmitriyev, Director of the Federal Military-Technical Service; Security 
Council Secretary Igor Ivanov; Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; Chief of the 
Foreign Intelligence Service, Sergei Lebedev; Chief of the Kremlin Administration 
Dmitri Medvedev; FSB Chief Nikolai Patrushev; Presidential Assistant Sergei 
Prikhodko; Industry & Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko; and Sergei Chemezov, 
Director of Rosoboroneksport among others. (6) 
 
Defense ministry reform 
With the battle over managerial control of the Armed Forces apparently won by 
Sergei Ivanov’s Defense Ministry, the structure of the newly-reformed Defmin, as 
decreed by the President, was recently outlined by Ivanov: The number of deputy 
defense ministers will be reduced from nine to four, two of whom will be 
designated first deputies. The new Chief of the General Staff, Yuri Baluyevsky, 
will serve as one of Ivanov’s first deputies (ex officio). The defense ministry will 
now officially have a core or "central staff" thought to number approximately 
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9,000 members. (7) The distinction of this central staff in terms of assignments 
and authority is not yet clear. 
 
Nuclear myths and the Ivanov reality 
A special exercise, "Emergency 2004," was conducted August 3-5 under the 
auspices of the Russian-NATO Cooperation Council with the intention of 
demonstrating the security of Russia’s nuclear facilities to NATO observers. The 
simulation scenario, prepared by the 12th Directorate of the Defense Ministry and 
led by Colonel-General Igor Valynkin, (who is tasked with securing the nuclear 
arsenals), envisioned an attack by international terrorists on a convoy 
transporting nuclear warheads. (8) 
 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, who led the NATO delegation on a tour of a 
nuclear arsenal near Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula, used the opportunity of 
the NATO visit to remind the delegation of the West’s promise of monetary aid in 
the amount of $5 billion to assist Russia with the security and destruction of 
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. (9) 
 
On August 9, President Putin held a meeting with his defense and nuclear 
leaders including Sergei Ivanov; Aleksandr Rumiantsev, head of the Federal 
Nuclear Energy Agency; new Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky; and 
Army General Aleksei Moskovsky among others. (10) At the meeting, Putin 
announced his decision to put the military sector of the nuclear industry under 
Sergei Ivanov's supervision. According to Putin, "the logic of the administrative 
reforms and perfection of performance of the government" prompted his decision 
to place Sergei Ivanov and the "Defense Ministry in charge of the atomic sphere 
where the nuclear defense complex is concerned." (11) 
 
While the "Emergency 2004" exercise ended successfully, with the help of the 
timely arrival of reinforcements for Russia’s nuclear security forces, which 
managed to surround the terrorists and frustrate their attempts to steal nuclear 
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material, military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer points out that the simulated 
response was a far cry from the actual raids last June in Ingushetia, when 
reinforcements took hours to respond to real attacks on conventional arsenals. 
(12) 
 
Despite Ivanov’s reassurances to the NATO delegation that it is a "myth" that 
"Russian nuclear weapons are poorly guarded," nuclear security may yet prove 
to be the poison chalice among Ivanov’s recent acquisitions of authority. (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Gazeta, 5 Aug 04, p. 2; What the Papers Say (WPS) via ISI Emerging 
Database. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Gazeta, 3 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Ibid. See article for more detailed information on the relative importance of 
individual ministers. 
(6) Krasnaya zvezda, 5 Aug 04, p.1; WPS — Defense and Security via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(7) Itogi, 3-8 Aug 04; WPS — Defense and Security via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database. 
(8) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 Aug 04; WPS — Defense and Security via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(9) Ibid. Thus far, only $400 million has reached Russia, according to Ivanov. 
(10) Krasnaya zvezda, 11 Aug 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(11) Kommersant, 10 Aug 04; WPS via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(12) The Moscow Times, 10 Aug 04 via 
www.moscowtimes.ru/2004/08/10/008.html. 
(13) Ibid. 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Nazran Raid Revisited 
Six weeks ago, Chechen and Ingush rebels participated in a successful raid on 
the Ingush capital, Nazran. During the raid, Acting Interior Minister Abukar 
Kostoyev was killed, and the insurgents raided a Russian arms dump. (1) In the 
immediate aftermath of the incident, allegations were made, specifically by 
Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, that the attack had been possible only because 
of treason on the part of the Security Services. (2) At the time, there was little 
evidence to support this claim. Instead, a more credible theory was that there 
had been simply a massive intelligence and inter-agency communications failure. 
(3) 
 
In response to the raid, the FSB mounted a massive manhunt, during the course 
of which Magomed Yevloyev, one of the alleged ringleaders of the incursion was 
killed. A Kommersant report by Sergei Dyupkin however, indicated that the FSB 
had killed the wrong individual. Dyupkin surmised that the FSB was desperate to 
convince the Duma and the Russian public that the culprit had been caught, and 
that this claim was rooted in the need for a cover-up. (4) 
 
During the first week of August, two stories emerged that shed new light on the 
Nazran incident, and give rise to the question of whether Zyazikov’s allegations 
in fact were correct. 
 
Russkii kurier gave further details concerning the FSB’s response to the raid. 
According to this story, within days, the FSB had made thirty arrests. The 
newspaper claimed to have obtained documentation relating to two suspects, 
Magomed Goboyevich Khamkhoyev, and Magomed Aspiyev, who participated in 
the incursion. The report states that these two men are Sergeants serving in the 
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Ingush Interior Ministry. Until recently, Khamkhoyev was head of the Sunzha 
District Internal Affairs Department, while Aspiyev is a serving member of OMON, 
the Interior Ministry’s armed force. (5) Moreover, the newspaper’s source claimed 
that Khamkhoyev is a member of the Sernovsk Wahabi Jamaat that ordered him 
to infiltrate the Interior Ministry. Aspiyev, on the other hand, apparently acted on 
his own accord to help guerillas bypass searches and road-blocks, and to 
smuggle weapons. (6) 
 
Moskovskii komsomolets provided more colorful details. Firstly, Abukar Kostoyev 
was killed in his car, allegedly by men wearing GRU commando uniforms. (7) 
Other insurgents were wearing OMON and FSB uniforms, and they were carrying 
NATO, not Russian, arms. These facts were provided by Kostoyev’s brother who 
was traveling with the Acting Interior Minister at the time. Kostoyev’s brother 
used his mobile phone to call Major General Koryakov, the local FSB Chief, to 
request help. Koryakov neither logged the call, nor sent reinforcements. (8) 
 
If these two stories are true, it must be concluded that Zyazikov’s allegations of 
treason on the part of the Security Services are plausible. However, the question 
remains as to why the Security Services would allow such a raid to go ahead. 
The answer must surely lie in the dispute between the FSB and Zyazikov 
regarding that agency’s tactics in the Chechen war. 
 
For some time, President Zyazikov has been critical of the Security Services' 
tactics in prosecuting the Chechen war. In March this year, he met with Security 
officials and "castigated" them for their behavior in conducting local operations, 
(9) and then, after the Nazran attacks, he directly addressed the FSB’s 
"abduction" tactics, noting that seven "disappearances" were reported in 
Ingushetia, and warning that "not a single vehicle with special license plates 
should enter Ingushetia." (10) 
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It seems evident that while the FSB did not directly facilitate the incursion of June 
22, it allowed it to occur. The FSB hoped that the expansion of the Chechen 
conflict into Ingushetia would force Zyazikov to reverse his opposition to Security 
Service tactics in pursuing rebels across Federation borders. 
 
FSB Tactics in Chechnya 
President Zyazikov’s comments concerning the FSB have company. Major 
concern has been voiced in recent weeks by several sources, over the FSB’s 
tactics and heightened level of activity in Chechnya and Ingushetia. 
 
On August 4 and 10, Amnesty International (11) and the International Helsinki 
Federation For Human Rights, (12) presented briefings concerning detentions, 
"disappearances", and torture in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Alone, these reports, 
which stated that "the situation in Chechnya continues to present the gravest 
challenge to human rights in the entire OSCE region," (13) provide cause for 
deep concern. But when FSB tactics are viewed through the prism of upcoming 
Chechen elections, they gain further significance. 
 
In a story on August 13, bound to cause irritation in the Kremlin, Novaya gazeta 
alleged that the FSB possesses an elite and secret unit known as Special 
Composite Group No.12 (SSG-12). According to Novaya gazeta, this group has 
been engaged in an ongoing war with the personal bodyguard of Ramzan 
Kadyrov, son of the late Chechen President, involving torture and abductions, in 
an attempt to influence the upcoming Presidential elections. (14) However, this 
analysis is questionable at best. Kadyrov is not a candidate in the presidential 
election. What then, is the FSB’s motivation in Chechnya? 
 
At this point in time, the most viable explanation is also the most disconcerting. 
On 30 July, according to Mikhail Rybakov's article in Rodnaya gazeta, "elements 
of the siloviki" are agitating for the cancellation of presidential elections in 
Chechnya. (15) In a move that Rybakov argued would induce "mass terror", this 
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group wishes to institute "harsher security sweeps and special operations among 
the republic’s civilian populace." (16) 
 
The Chechen Presidential Security Services, headed by Kadyrov, represent the 
principal law enforcement body in Chechnya. As such, they constitute the main 
obstacle for the FSB, if its goal indeed is the creation of a terror regime. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX, Number 11 (15 Jul 04). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) See NIS Observed: An Analytical Review Volume IX, Number 12 (4 August 
2004). 
(5) Russkii kurier, 30 Jul 04; WPS-What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Moskovskii komsomolets, 4 Aug 04; WPS-Defense and Security via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Russkii kurier, 30 Jul 04; WPS-What the Papers Say via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database. 
(10) Moskovskii komsomolets, 7 Jul 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(11) Amnesty International Urgent Action Appeal, 10 Aug 04 via 
web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460452004?open&of=ENG-RUS . 
(12) "Chechnya: Enforced ‘Disappearances’, Extrajudicial Killings and Unlawful 
Detentions — An Update", International Helsinki Federation For Human Rights 
Publication, 8 Aug 04 via www.ihf-hr.org . 
(13) Ibid, Page 2. 
(14) Novaya gazeta, 12 Aug 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
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(15) Rodnaya gazeta, 30 Jul 04 via "Are the Siloviki Preparing a Major 
Crackdown in Chechnya?", Lawrence Uzzell, Chechnya Weekly, Volume 5, Issue 
31, 4 Aug 04. 
(16) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Maolmordha McGowan 
 
"How to Fire a Russian Bureaucrat" according to Sergei Lavrov 
On July 12, all senior Russian diplomats attended a meeting at the Foreign 
Ministry. In his brief opening remarks, the only part of the gathering that reporters 
were allowed to attend, President Putin berated the Ministry’s staff for allowing 
Russia’s image abroad to deteriorate and for "cluttering up the mail" at the 
Kremlin with impractical and worthless information and analysis. His criticism 
provided a suitable introduction for an overhaul of the foreign ministry. In an 
overview of the reform plan, Putin announced that seven of its 42 departments 
would be cut. The remaining 35 would be maintained by a staff of 3028, down 
from 3500. (1) 
 
Putin also announced that Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov would enjoy the 
service of seven deputies instead of twelve, and only one would hold the title of 
first deputy, down from three. (2) Confusion was evident as who was in and who 
was out, with several media outlets reporting staff changes that were not 
reflected by President Putin’s decrees of 13-14 August. 
 
As noted in the NIS Observed in May, the Kremlin’s request that the MFA reduce 
its deputy staff might constitute a natural opportunity for Lavrov to align the 
remainder with him, considering that all twelve of his deputies were appointed to 
their posts before he was promoted in April. (3) As expected of course, Lavrov 
has kept many of his fellow MFA veterans on the staff. 
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Russia-CIS affairs authority Valeri V. Loshinin will keep his first deputy position. 
U.S./NATO-Russian relations and nonproliferation expert Sergei Kislyak will keep 
his deputy post, as will Middle East and Africa specialist Aleksandr Saltanov. 
Vladimir Chizhov, another foreign ministry veteran and E.U./NATO-Russia affairs 
specialist will also continue as deputy. While initial reports said that Sergei Razov 
would be sent to replace the veteran Chinese ambassador Igor Rogachev, (4) 
Putin’s decree of 13 August reappointed him as deputy foreign minister. Yuri V. 
Fedotov had to wait an additional day for his reappointment to the deputy 
position, in which he has focused recently on U.N.-Russian and East Asian 
affairs. (5) 
 
The new deputy is Aleksandr Alekseyev, a 57-year old career diplomat, who will 
be responsible for Asian affairs. Alekseyev previously served as ambassador-at-
large and headed the Russian mission to the OSCE in Vienna. He served also as 
Director of the Third European Department, and as ambassador to Pakistan. 
Most recently, Alekseyev led the Russian delegation to the six-party negotiations 
over North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. (6) Those talks were held at the deputy 
minister level, so his promotion to that position was to be expected. 
 
Deputy Foreign Minister Doku G. Zavgayev, who was the Moscow-backed 
President of Chechnya, 1995-96, has been appointed Director-General of the 
MFA. He was Russian ambassador to Tanzania from 1997 until February 2004 
when he was recalled to Moscow by President Putin. While some expected that 
he might deal with Chechen affairs, he was described as "responsible for 
bureaucratic affairs," (7) and early reports said he would run the finance and 
loans directorate. (8) It is still unclear whether this assignment represents a 
promotion involving greater power or a simple change of title. With Putin still 
interested in advancing a public perception of Chechnya’s reintegration into 
Russia, awarding Zavgayev a "virtual promotion" might play a role in that effort. 
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Eleonora V. Mitrofanova, who was deputy in charge of "protecting the rights of 
fellow countrymen abroad," (9) was chosen to lead the new Agency for Contacts 
with Compatriots. (10) Given her previous assignment and the name of the new 
agency she will run, it is not clear what has changed. 
 
Three deputy foreign ministers were sent out of Moscow on ambassadorial 
assignments. Andrei I. Denisov was appointed Russia’s permanent 
representative to the United Nations, the post held by Sergei Lavrov and vacant 
since the latter became foreign minister in March. (11) His command of the 
English and Chinese languages may be of help. 
 
The thirty-year MFA veteran, Aleksei L. Fedetov, who was barely visible during 
his two-year tenure as deputy foreign minister, was appointed Ambassador to the 
Czech Republic in March 2004. (12) 
 
Yevgeni Primakov's former deputy, Vyacheslav I. Trubnikov, was demoted from 
First Deputy to Russian ambassador to India on 3 August. (13) A 24-year veteran 
of the KGB and later the director of Primakov's Foreign Intelligence Service 
(SVR), this silovik was moved by newly-elected President Putin from the SVR to 
the foreign ministry as first deputy and special representative of the President to 
the CIS. Trubnikov’s removal from the SVR reflected the Russian President's 
rivalry with Primakov and Putin’s preference for elevating his alma mater Federal 
Security Service (FSB) veterans at the expense of other security agencies. 
Current rumors refer to a putative FSB takeover of SVR. 
 
As recently as 1 June, Trubnikov claimed to be working with the OSCE on 
"drafting the final political document" on the Moldovan crisis. (14) Tensions in 
Moldova/Transdniestria since have risen significantly, and his experience there 
might have been deemed valuable for Russia. 
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Instead, Trubnikov finds himself in New Delhi. Relations with India remain 
important for both countries, though not as much as those with the CIS. 
However, neither Lavrov nor Putin have much interest in letting Primakov’s old 
cronies hang around. 
 
More surprisingly, the other silovik deputy foreign minister, Anatoli Y. Safonov, 
was also relieved of his post. He was deputy director of the FSB from 1995-99, 
serving directly under Vladimir Putin while the latter was FSB director in 1998-99. 
As the deputy in charge of anti-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and anti-organized 
crime operations, his role was particularly important and might have been 
considered secure. Not to worry, since it seems impossible to fire a Russian 
government bureaucrat unless he is headed for jail (as will be seen later). ITAR-
TASS reported he was moved to a new, unreported position. (15) It would not be 
surprising, however, to see Safonov resurface in some sort of anti-terrorism 
capacity. 
 
A predictable fall from grace concerns Viktor Kalyuzhny, whose experience in the 
oil industry was both his greatest asset and liability. In 1997, Kalyuzhny was CFO 
of Eastern Oil Company (VNK) when it was bought by Yukos, which immediately 
fired him. He left the oil industry to enter politics, serving as first deputy minister, 
then Minister of Fuel and Energy. His animosity toward Yukos did not subside; he 
reportedly held a grudge against Mikhail Khodorkovsky from the Yukos/VNK take 
over. (16) 
 
As Minister of Fuel and Energy, Kalyuzhny built a record of favoritism for Sibneft 
Oil and other companies associated with oligarchs Roman Abramovich and Boris 
Berezovsky, that aligned him firmly with Yel'tsin's "family." Soon after his 
appointment, rumors surfaced in the Russian media that Abramovich himself 
sponsored Kalyuzhny’s candidacy, provided he were personally consulted on key 
ministry decisions. Kalyuzhny certainly seemed to have dues to pay, since he 
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almost immediately awarded 6 million barrels of Iraqi oil exports under the oil-for-
food program to Sibneft, at the expense of state-run Transneft. (17) 
 
The inevitability of Kalyuzhny’s eventual fall from grace can be traced to Putin’s 
tenure as prime minister. At the time Putin had difficulty dealing with oil lobbies 
and their influence on Russian energy policy through Kalyuzhny. While he was 
Fuel and Energy Minister in 1999, Kalyuzhny, and widely-known oligarch ally 
First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko, orchestrated the removal of 
state-controlled oil pipeline monopoly Transneft’s president Dmitri Saveliev. 
Kalyuzhny personally ousted Saveliev (citing authority granted him by the 
privatization ministry) while Putin was in New Zealand. (18) When Saveliev 
refused to move, Kalyuzhny ordered 300 policemen to take chainsaws to 
Transneft’s doors so that his chosen candidate, vice president of LUKoil Semyon 
Vainshtok, could enter his office. (19) While Putin’s authority clearly was being 
challenged by the oligarchs, Putin chose to ignore the problem for the time being 
to avoid making powerful enemies before the 2000 election. 
 
Putin managed to destroy Aksyonenko in about three years. Prime Minister Putin 
first demoted him to Railways Minister, though Aksyonenko ran a powerful 
government committee that could bypass Putin’s authority on some issues. In 
2001, the Audit Chamber charged him with abuse of office and misuse of $370 
million in state funds at the Railroads Ministry. Putin fired him in 2002, the interior 
ministry then added a tax evasion charge, and he ended up in a Swiss hospital 
with a serious illness. He is awaiting trial. (20) 
 
It should come as no shock that Viktor Kalyuzhny has been similarly 
marginalized. After the 2000 election, Putin reformed the cabinet, demoting 
Kalyuzhny from Fuel and Energy Minister to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and Special Representative of the President to the Caspian Sea region. 
Kalyuzhny has been far less controversial at this post, while his documented 
rivalry with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his relevant and important work on 
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Caspian Sea issues probably has helped him to last so long. Given his resume, 
however, he still faced an uphill battle to survive Sergei Lavrov’s housecleaning. 
Putin himself has probably had more than enough of Kalyuzhny, especially with 
his failure to block the American-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline 
and the South Caucasus natural gas pipeline (SCP), both of which bypass 
Russian territory in their paths to the Mediterranean Sea. Kalyuzhny’s historic 
allegiance to the oligarchs and their oil interests was certainly a factor, since 
curbing these influences has been a longstanding Putin objective. Kalyuzhny will 
become Russia’s next ambassador to Latvia, stationed a good 900 miles from 
the nearest major oil field. (21) However, it is also worth noting that the three 
deputy foreign ministers with the least diplomatic experience, Mitrofana, 
Zavgayev and Kalyuzhny, were all among those who were stripped of their titles. 
 
The reform of the foreign ministry was touted as a move to fight corruption and 
duplication by slashing staff and, on paper, six of the twelve deputies were 
removed. However, only three or four of those positions actually seem to have 
been eliminated. 
 
In the end, the career diplomats won the day at the MFA. All seven of the 
remaining deputies: Loshchinin; Chizhov; Y. Fedotov; Kislyak; Razov; Saltanov; 
and the newly promoted Alekseyev are longtime MFA veterans. Denisov, also 
among this group, received what could be considered a promotion to 
Ambassador to the U.N.. To the extent that he, rather than Putin, played a role, 
Lavrov, who is a career diplomat himself, certainly succeeded in reforming his 
deputy staff to his liking. And, as only a lifetime Russian bureaucrat can, he 
managed to do so without actually having to fire anybody. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Vremya novostei, 13 July 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) ITAR-TASS, 20 July 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(3) See NIS Observed, 12 May 04 for background on the deputy foreign 
ministers. 
(4) The Moscow Times, 15 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) ITAR-TASS, 14 Aug 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) ITAR-TASS, 13 Aug 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Prime-Tass Business News Agency, 13 Aug 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Vremya novostei, ibid. 
(9) NTV MIR, 26 May 03; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(10) Russkii kurier, 14 Jul 04; WPS via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) The Moscow Times, 15 Jul 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(12) Czech News Agency, 4 Feb 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(13) Interfax 3 Aug 04, BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(14) ITAR-TASS, 2 June 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(15) ITAR-TASS, 14 Aug 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) Financial Times Energy Newsletter, 1 May 99 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(17) The Russia Journal, 29 May 00 via 
http://www.therussiajournal.com/index.htm?obj=2943. 
(18) The Moscow Times, 20 May 00 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(19) The Moscow Times, 5 Oct 99 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(20) The Moscow Times, 19 Nov 03; Rusnet Business Information via 
http://www.rusnet.nl/news/2003/11/19/currentaffairs02.shtml. 
(21) The Moscow Times, 15 Jul 04, ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Kate Martin 
 
MEDIA 
The best of times, the worst of times 
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The Russian government apparently has discovered the most efficient way to 
guarantee positive news coverage: mandate it. The official media reportedly have 
been instructed to use care, and specific phrases, when discussing controversial 
subjects. While "Vesti" program producers would not confirm or deny reports that 
instructions had been issued to the Rossiya channel members, an adviser to the 
chairman of the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company 
(VGTRK), did assert that television, since it is a public medium, should be 
compelled to use formal titles and identifications, rather than vernacular terms 
that might cloud the issue. Thus, the recently passed legislation changing 
expected social benefits into cash payments must be "monetized benefits," not 
"replacement of benefits with money," and that pesky rebellious region that 
continues to cause such headaches in Moscow will be referred to as the 
"Chechen Republic," not "Chechnya." Other banned phrases include "bank crisis" 
and "hit man" — one can only imagine "federal financial challenge" and 
"offensive-human elimination professional" soon will creep into the official 
lexicon. 
 
Similar wording instructions reportedly have been issued at Channel One "so that 
the people will not be confused," one station manager explained. "For them, this 
is already such a complex system. We do this simply so they will know what we 
are talking about and will not think this is something different, something new 
they will have to think about." (1) 
 
Clearly another way not to confuse the poor citizens is to limit the amount of 
information available to them. Thus, they may not even learn much about the 
current discussions concerning how free "freedom of information" should be. This 
is a case where confusion would be understandable, however. At first glance, 
Economic Minister German Gref’s proposal, that would charge for information 
retrieval and distribution of large documents, would appear to be an instance of 
setting up an obstacle to the press. However, the camps opposed to the proposal 
provide a clear indication that this issue is anything but transparent: The 
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Journalists’ Union is against the article that allows for the levying of a fee to offset 
copying costs for documents over a set number of pages (at 24 pages, a limit 
one must note that most government documents would surpass), while some 
government agencies are opposed to providing information at all. (2) Yet others 
in the Cabinet cited the possibilities of fees for information as the reason for 
rejecting the proposal. (3) 
 
Whatever the reason, the Cabinet’s rejection of the draft further delays any 
notion of citizen access to what the government is doing, at least without the 
government’s own "spin". Gref’s proposal would mandate the release of all non-
secret information from federal and regional ministries and agencies, local 
government bodies, the parliament, the presidential apparat, courts and the 
Auditing Chamber. However, the proposal is vague about what would be 
considered confidential information; it is likely going to be decided by 
bureaucrats, a notion that does not bode well for investigative journalism. 
 
While the Journalists’ Union is upset about proposed charges for information, 
some individuals expressed their willingness to pay a fee. Businessmen noted 
that the need for details is there. "Ministries and agencies are closed off at 
present — and it’s not because the bureaucrats don’t want to give out 
information. There is simply no mechanism in place for information provision," 
said Vladislav Koroshnkin, Vice President of the OPORA business association. 
"Both as a citizen and a representative of a company, I would be interested in 
access to information such as tax agency data proving that my actions in any 
particular situation were lawful," said Aleksander Shokhin, the head of the board 
at Renaissance Capital. Shokhin indicated some hesitation, however, in paying. 
"If the information related to the activities of a government body, which is funded 
by taxpayers’ money, why should an extra payment be required?," he asked. (4) 
 
The undefined amount of the fee also caused some concern. "If government 
bodies do not want to give you information, they can make such a high fee that 
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citizens do not want to get that information anymore," Vladimir Pribylovsky, head 
of the Panorama think tank, said. "Nothing will really change." Another political 
analyst, Dmitri Orlov, at the Agency for Political and Economic Communications, 
said that while the law would violate the constitutional right of free access to 
information, it would affect "only the active part of the population, like 
businessmen or lobbyists...not the average citizen," who want to get information. 
(5) 
 
Meanwhile, another avenue of information has been closed: Many observers of 
the state of Russia’s media noted with dismay the cancellation of NTV’s popular 
political talk show "Freedom of Speech" that was hosted by respected journalist 
(and former Moscow bureau chief of Radio Liberty) Savik Shuster. Since the 
cancellation followed July’s personnel shakeups at NTV and Gazprom-Media, 
speculation has been rampant that the decision was based on politics, rather 
than ratings. (6) 
 
Obviously, the dissemination of information about government activities, 
legislation and requirements is one of the most important responsibilities of the 
media in a free society. Thus, continued attempts to restrict that information, and 
to constrain the media in general, are considerably worrisome. There appears to 
be little doubt that the Russian government is adept at controlling what 
information gets out and, to a large extent, even the words used to describe its 
actions. But intervention does not end there: Also under scrutiny is the economic 
aspect of the media. 
 
While three bills to ensure media economic independence are under Duma 
discussion, (7) the secretary general of the Journalists’ Union is demanding an 
about-face in the government’s policies concerning the treatment of the media. 
Igor Yakovenko declared that "it is the federal authorities that are posing the 
main threat to the media’s independence" by following a policy aimed at 
nationalizing media outlets "to oust journalism from them." Moreover, Yakovenko 
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declared, the Kremlin has consistently portrayed journalists as enemies of the 
people. "Over the last four years, various officials, starting from the top, have 
constantly said that journalists are to blame for everything," he added. (8) 
 
It is difficult to disagree, as reporters have been blamed for many crises 
bedeviling Russia, from the Nord-Ost hostage drama, to banking crises, to 
terrorism. Government policy may succeed in convincing citizens that the media 
really are to blame — particularly if the flow of information to the contrary is 
stemmed. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0802 via World News 
Connection. 
(2) Rossiyskaya gazeta, 4 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0805 via World News 
Connection. 
(3) Gazeta, 2 Aug 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8310, 2 Aug 04. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) Moscow Times, 2 Aug 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8310, 2 Aug 04. 
(6) Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 Jul 04, Yezhednedelniy zhurnal, 12 Jul 04, Izvestiya, 
9 Jul 04, and Moskovsky komsomolets, 9 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0716 via World 
News Connection. 
(7) RosBusiness Consulting, 4 Aug 04 via Johnson’s Russia List #8314, 4 Aug 
04. 
(8) Ekho Moskvy, 0956 GMT, 4 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via Johnson’s Russia 
List #8315, 5 Aug 04. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
 21 
MOLDOVA 
Moldovan schools in Transdniestr are still closed 
Ever since Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin’s failure to sign the 
federalization plan proposed by Moscow, the Transdniestr authorities have tried 
to get the topic of Dniestr's future back on Voronin's agenda. The purpose of the 
whole "Moldovan schools in Transdniestr can not use Latin script" exercise might 
be intended to push precisely that agenda. The choice of such a sensitive issue 
is further proof that Transdniestr is not willing to wait for a decision on status any 
longer, and Smirnov's refusal to give in to international demands to reopen the 
schools is an indication that Dniestr authorities are serious about having their 
future determined sooner rather than later. Since neither side is willing to 
compromise, the fight is promising to be long and hard. 
 
More than enough economic and emotional damage has been done already. On 
1 August, Chisinau imposed economic sanctions on Tiraspol, which, in turn, 
turned off the electricity in 50 Moldovan villages and was threatening to leave half 
of Moldova without power, including Chisinau. The suspension of power already 
has hit 215,000 persons and potentially can affect more that a million. (1) 
Economic sanctions from Moldova can cost Transdniestr anywhere from $50 to 
$60 million per month, since total exports from the Dniestr republic to Moldova 
proper constitute about $600 million annually. Meanwhile, the Tiraspol police are 
showing off their strength vis-à-vis Chisinau by throwing the parents of children 
whose schools have been closed into prisons full of dangerous criminals. 
 
Sitting down to negotiate about the future of Transdniestr might be the only 
solution that will make Smirnov’s government rethink the schools’ closures. Such 
negotiations will involve Russia, U.S.A., E.U. and the OSCE. This time, however, 
Dniestr might not settle for being part of a federation. Viktor Balala, Justice 
Minister of the breakaway republic, said that "Moldova has buried the chance of 
forming a federal state with Transdnestria" after refusing to sign a federation 
agreement proposed by Russia last year. "There cannot be any talk about a 
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federation since there are neither economic, nor legal, nor political reasons for it," 
said Balala. (2) As for reaching the compromise on the school issue, Dniestr 
authorities already said that they had offered their "compromise" solution, 
namely, allowing the schools to reopen only if the schools agree to teach 
according to Dniestr curriculum -- a ridiculous demand, according to Moldovan 
schools, since Dniestr schools still use textbooks printed in the 1970s, which 
were devised under the old Soviet curriculum. It is quite possible that Moldova or 
Romania might come to the aid of the students affected and offer to place them 
in schools in either or both countries. This might put off the decision on 
Transdniestr's future. 
 
However the situation may unfold, it is clear that Smirnov's government is intent 
on demonstrating to Voronin and the world that Transdniestr is a separate 
county, which is willing and able to enforce its rules. 
 
Protests against policies toward Teleradio-Moldova 
The biggest media protest in years took place over the last several weeks, in 
which about 1,500 former members of the Teleradio-Moldova company took part. 
In the beginning of August, the government of Moldova renamed Teleradio-
Moldova and reorganized its format, eliminating programs that featured reports 
critical of the government and replacing them with foreign-produced 
entertainment programs. The reorganization of the company resulted in 
approximately a 40% reduction of its staff, leaving many journalists without jobs. 
The Moldovan authorities said that the reorganization of the company had been 
undertaken in order to modernize Moldovan television and to provide TV-viewers 
with an "international-standard" product and that freedom of speech was, in no 
way, intended to be curtailed. (3) A more probable reality is, however, that the 
government attempted to rid the company of journalists who object to the 
government's influence on editorial policy. 
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Protesters were carrying banners which read: "Long Live Moldova!", "Voronin 
Dictatorship Down!" and "Down with Communism!" (4) The night of 9 August the 
media protest was broken up by a group of unknown individuals, who vandalized 
the tents of the protesters and destroyed hundreds of banners during the night. 
There are speculations that the government might have ordered the vandalism, 
since the night before the authorities had ordered to switch off all the lights in the 
encampment, facilitating the demolition of the camp. 
 
UKRAINE 
Pre-election campaign update 
The number of presidential candidates finalized…or not 
A total of twenty-six presidential candidates has been registered to participate in 
the elections scheduled for 31 October 2004. Only four of the presidential 
candidates are considered to be serious contenders for the presidential post: 
Viktor Yushchenko, Viktor Yanukovich, Aleksandr Moroz and Pyotr Simonenko. 
There is still a chance for a fifth serious contender for power to appear, namely, 
Leonid Kuchma. Even though the deadline for the registration has passed (2 
August), should Kuchma manage to push through political reform in the fall, there 
is a real possibility that he might become a very powerful prime-minister in 
Ukraine. 
 
Opposition candidates sign a fair election accord 
Right after the list of presidential candidates had been finalized, the opposition 
presidential candidates Yushchenko and Moroz signed a fair election accord, 
agreeing to work together in order to prevent election fraud. Moroz and 
Simonenko signed a similar agreement. When invited by Yushchenko to sign a 
fair election pact, Viktor Yanukovich refused even to consider it, calling it a 
"campaign gimmick." (5) 
 
Pre-election coverage is largely skewed in favor of Yanukovich 
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There are numerous reports which are coming from various independent sources 
that Yanukovich’s election campaign is marred by prejudicial and illegal actions. 
The Ukrainskaya Pravda website quoted a statement of Nikolai Katerenchuk, an 
assistant to Yushchenko, in which he gives various examples of the Ukrainian 
mass media covering Viktor Yanukovich in a favorable light by means of 
promotional TV and radio, (6) while devoting considerable air-time to negative 
reports about Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko’s complaint that Yanukovich 
promotes himself under the guise of "news reports" was rejected by the Central 
Electoral Commission. The Commission’s reply was that the reports in question 
constituted "legitimate coverage of political events, in which Yanukovich is 
featured in his official capacity as prime-minister. (7) 
 
Illegal signatures collection by Yanukovich 
Meanwhile, Yanukovich managed to gather more than 5 million signatures in 
support of his candidacy, far more than the 500,000 necessary to qualify for the 
presidential race. Hundreds of illegal pre-election activities have been registered 
all over Ukraine during the past month. An independent non-partisan citizens’ 
organization, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU), has issued a report 
recently which outlined numerous occasions of illegal actions endorsed by 
Yanukovich. Such cases include the organization of massive pro-Yanukovich 
demonstrations, in which employees of certain organizations are either made to 
take part under the threat of being fired or talked into it by promises of extra days 
off and bonuses. Observations of forging signatures in support of Yanukovich 
also are common. Some regional mayors and administrators are given quotas for 
signature collection in support of Yanukovich. A pensioner even testified that she 
was forced to sign a petition in favor of Yanukovich before she was allowed to 
collect her monthly pension. (8) 
 
Yushchenko is followed by police 
During his tour of Crimea, Victor Yushchenko reported that someone was spying 
on him. When interrogated about the incident, the local policemen said that they 
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were providing security to all presidential candidates and not spying on them. 
However, later, on the road which leads to Ai-Peri (a mountain top, where 
Yushchenko, strangely enough, was planning to collect garbage as a part of his 
pre-election campaign), a car full of "spying equipment" was found. (9) Twelve 
license plates, two video cameras and other recording equipment was found in 
the vehicle. Yushchenko's entire stay in Sevastopol’ with his family was 
videotaped. 
 
The latest developments in the Ukrainian pre-election campaign are extremely 
discouraging. Even though there has been some negative reaction from the 
West, no one from outside Ukraine attempted to take any serious measures in 
response to the illegal activities. If Yanukovich managed to mobilize the whole 
country to forge signatures, threaten medical workers, and refuse to give 
pensions to the elderly, there is little doubt that he has enough power to 
manipulate the elections results, just in case these 5 million persons, who signed 
his petitions and went to his demonstrations, refuse to vote for him. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Basapress News agency, 7 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) Moscow Interfax, 6 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0805 via World News 
Connection. 
(3) Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 Aug 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) Basapress news agency, 9 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) Interfax-Ukraine, 2 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 08 Aug 04 via 
http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/archive/2004/august/13/2.shtml . 
(7) Interfax-Ukraine, 3 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Committee of Voters of Ukraine, "Election Campaign Marred by Significant 
Illegal Government Interference, Say Non-partisan Ukrainian Observers" via 
http://www.cvu.org.ua/?menu=fp&po=doc&lang=eng . 
 26 
(9) Ukrainskaya pravda website, 10 Aug 04 via http://www2.pravda.com.ua/ru/ . 
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CHECHNYA 
In anticipation of the 29 August Chechen special presidential election, Moscow is 
pursuing a dual-pronged strategy of promoting Major General Alu Alkhanov’s 
campaign while simultaneously undercutting Ramzan Kadyrov’s military 
authority. The Russian leadership seeks to undermine Kadyrov’s jurisdiction by 
either abolishing the "presidential guard" he commands or subsuming some of its 
members into a new crack Interior Ministry regiment. Moscow’s aim appears to 
be to ensure Alu Alkhanov’s success in the election, on the assumption that he is 
both strong and willing enough to keep Kadyrov in check. However, Moscow’s 
wisdom is questionable considering Alkhanov’s recent public displays of support 
for Kadyrov. 
 
Moscow's support for Alkhanov's bid for the Chechen presidency is indicated by 
several moves. On 4 August, Alkhanov received the support of the bureau of the 
supreme council of the United Russia party and the political council of the United 
Russia branch of Chechnya, a factor of great importance since the Chechnya 
branch of United Russia has 27,000 members. (1) Additionally, a source in the 
Chechen Electoral Commission informed the Caucasus Times that electoral 
commission officials have been given verbal instructions to ensure Alkhanov’s 
victory. (2) The source added that in order to ensure the necessary number of 
votes in Alkhanov’s favor, commission officials have been ordered to invalidate 
and forge votes. 
 
While guaranteeing Alkhanov’s victory in the forthcoming presidential election, 
Moscow is attempting also to weaken Kadyrov’s military apparatus and authority 
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throughout Chechnya. On 31 July, Putin announced the creation of a special 
purpose Interior Ministry regiment to be deployed in Chechnya, and, on 11 
August, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov proposed the formation of a special anti-
terrorist mountain brigade. (3) The Special Forces mountain unit will provide 
additional security in Chechen cities until the inauguration of the new Chechen 
president, when it will assume anti-terrorist operations. As a representative of the 
Chechen Interior Ministry indicated, the presence of 14,000 alerted Chechen 
Interior Ministry personnel stationed throughout the republic negates the need for 
extra Russian security forces in the republic during the election. (4) In reality, this 
Special Force will conduct anti-terrorist operations in concert with the western 
battalion commander Major Said Magomed Kakiyev. (5) This entity may serve to 
undercut Kadyrov’s forces and his counterterrorist abilities. Although Alkhanov 
supported Putin’s desire to create an elite Interior Ministry regiment and has 
taken measures to supply the unit with weaponry, (6) he has balked over the 
further escalation of federal forces in Chechnya as suggested by Ivanov. At a 
press conference, he encouraged a concerted effort between Kadyrov’s men and 
the Russian forces. (7) This followed Aslan Maskhadov’s claim of responsibility 
for the 22 June Ingush incursion and his threat to assassinate the winner of the 
forthcoming special presidential election. (8) Alkhanov labeled Maskhadov’s 
claims to have 2,500-3,000 rebels at his disposal as pure propaganda while 
claiming that Maskhadov’s military power and projection have been severely 
curtailed by the ongoing Interior Ministry and federal forces military operations. 
However, given the current instability in Chechnya and the apparent union of 
Ingush and Chechen fighters against Russian forces and their allies, one would 
assume that Alkhanov would welcome additional forces for the upcoming 
Chechen presidential election. 
 
Alkhanov’s balk at further increases in federal units may indicate a developing 
aversion to the Kremlin’s forceful Chechen military policy. 
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Kadyrov’s recent scathing remarks regarding Russian federal forces highlight 
Putin’s failure to dominate the Chechen security services. Kadyrov’s statements 
have ranged from threats, such as "if the Chechen people demand we fight 
against Russia, we shall obey" (9) to accusing federal forces, at a Chechen state 
council meeting, of betrayal during an armed clash with separatists on 14 July in 
the Chechen village of Avtury. According to Kadyrov, when the battle began, the 
Chechen Interior Ministry guardsmen ran out of ammunition so Kadyrov radioed 
for aid and support from federal commanders. When no one responded to the 
request, Kadyrov demanded that federal forces block critical roads to prevent the 
guerrillas from escaping– an order which was also ignored. (10) 
 
Kadyrov further charged the Chechen power structures with corruption, 
abducting persons and perpetrating crimes against humanity. (11) Kadyrov 
added that the Interior Ministry and Gosstroi (the State Committee for 
Construction, Architecture and Housing) would be reformed and "dedicated" to 
"vigilantly" protecting the quality of life of the Chechen population. (12) 
 
At a Chechen state council meeting Alkhanov supported Kadyrov’s accusations 
that the federal security services are responsible for armed robberies, burglaries, 
looting, and abductions throughout Chechnya. Alkhanov further emphasized that 
one of the primary concerns of the new Chechen government will be to ensure 
the protection of citizens against every venue of organized crime and violence. 
(13) 
 
Such public support for Kadyrov and opposition to an increased presence of 
Russian troops in Chechnya indicates Alkhanov’s growing desire to establish 
Chechen political and military independence from Moscow. Alkhanov has also 
started promoting an economic plan designed to sponsor and eventually 
guarantee Chechen economic autonomy and independence from Russia -- one 
nearly identical to the model Kadyrov's father supported before his assassination. 
Alkhanov’s strategy envisions a free economic zone in which the Chechen 
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government monitors its land, subsoil minerals and resources, as well as 
establishing independent customs duties and cooperating directly with foreign 
partners. (14) Alkhanov’s economic initiatives and political backing for Kadyrov’s 
idiosyncrasies will not endear him to Moscow, and will further inflame the on-
going power struggle in the Kremlin over who should control the Chechen 
political apparatus. 
 
Increased tension in relations between Kadyrov and federal commanders is 
reportedly linked to a behind-the-scenes power struggle in the Kremlin over the 
Chechen elections. The leadership in the General Staff and the Joint Group of 
Federal Forces in the North Caucasus are endeavoring to persuade Putin to 
cancel the elections because, they maintain, the election campaign is 
undermining stability and provoking more intensive guerilla activity. In reality, the 
increased level of recent guerrilla activity in Chechnya is due to the general 
population's sense of impotence over the outcome of the special presidential 
election. In addition, the incidences of detentions, "disappearances", torture in 
Chechnya and the rapidly deteriorating Ingush refugee situation, as documented 
in the reports on August 4 and 10 by Amnesty International and International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, (15) serve further to radicalize the 
Chechen and Ingush populations against the Russian federal forces and provide 
fresh recruits for ongoing guerilla activities. 
 
GEORGIA 
During the past two weeks of the standoff with South Ossetia, Georgia has 
proven itself to be a wily political adversary. Georgia has employed a restrained 
"diplomacy-first" strategy, highlighted by many attempts to involve international 
players in the conflict. Georgia’s policy contrasts sharply with Russia’s belligerent 
determination to maintain unilateral control in negotiating the Georgian-South 
Ossetian conflict. In pursuing a policy of stabilization and integration of South 
Ossetia via multilateral diplomacy, nuanced by a fierce determination to maintain 
Georgian territorial sovereignty in the face of Russian pressure, Georgian has 
 30 
managed to avoid needless bloodshed while gaining the growing support of the 
international community. 
 
The most recent phase of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict was instigated by 
a Georgian demand to monitor its territorial waters against unmarked and 
unregistered shipping vessels around the port of Sukhumi. (16) Although Georgia 
was within her sovereign rights, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned 
Saakashvili's announcement that the Georgian navy would open fire on any 
unrecognized vessel attempting to enter port without obtaining prior permission. 
(17) 
 
Instead of relinquishing authority or further inflaming the scenario, the Georgian 
government fell back on a "diplomacy- first" policy as demonstrated by 
Saakashvili’s meeting on 5 August with U.S. Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld 
and Secretary of State Colin Powell. (18) Simultaneous to Saakashvili’s U.S. 
visit, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania unveiled a three point plan to the 
Georgian public for negotiating the South Ossetian conflict. (19) According to the 
plan, Georgia will pursue direct talks with the South Ossetian leadership, seeking 
to increase the OSCE mandate in South Ossetia and accomplish a complete 
demilitarization of the conflict zone. (20) To further dispel tensions with Russia, 
despite Georgian reports of Russian aircraft violating Georgian airspace, (21) 
Georgian Defense Minister Giorgi Baramidze and Minister of the State Giorgi 
Khaindrava traveled to Moscow for talks with Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov. (22) The decision to send Baramidze, a hard-liner, and Khaindrava, a 
dove, indicates that the Georgian government realized the negotiations with 
Russia would not yield any viable solution. Instead, Zhvania and Saakashvili 
sought to distance Baramidze from personally forming or participating in a 
campaign to neutralize South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, a man whom 
Baramidze compared to a "terrorist" while predicting that Kokoity will suffer the 
full brunt of the tensions. (23) Baramidze’s hawkish stance also explains his 
transfer from being Interior Minister to Defense Minister since Saakashvili and 
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Zhvania wanted to preclude the possibility that Baramidze might overreact in an 
anticipated conflict with South Ossetia. By sending Baramidze with diplomatically 
inclined Khaindrava to Moscow, Saakashvili and Zhvania removed a potential 
obstacle to peace in Tbilisi. 
 
On 12 August, Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania and Khaindrava traveled to South 
Ossetia for an emergency meeting of the Joint Commission Council and to 
conduct a survey tour of the conflict zone. (24) These talks, which addressed the 
withdrawal of illegal outposts and armed formations, (25) were temporarily 
jeopardized when Zhvania’s motorcade came under fire on the detour road to 
Tskhinvali, and armed skirmishes broke out between South Ossetian and 
Georgian fighters. (26) 
 
However, on 15 August, the commission chairmen from North Ossetia, Georgia, 
and South Ossetia signed a cease-fire protocol for Georgia and South Ossetia. 
(27) Despite this protocol, Georgian TV reported that the Ossetian side opened 
fire on Georgian villages on 14 August, seriously wounding seven Georgian 
peacekeepers. (28) Intense fighting continued through the evening of 15 August. 
(29) As the JCC, with its Moscow-dominated protocol, has proven to be 
ineffectual at best, President Mikheil Saakashvili is currently seeking an 
international conference on South Ossetia to be attended by all the OSCE 
members. (30) If the international community responds to Georgia’s request, it 
would further undermine Russian power in the South Caucasus while opening 
the region to greater European and Western. 
 
Source notes: 
 
(1) Krasnaya zvezda, 11 Aug 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) Russian Political 
Monitor via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Caucasus Times, 14 Aug 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
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Markets. 
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Markets. 
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Responding to the suicide bombings in Uzbekistan and political 
developments in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan 
In response to the 30 July suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, security has been 
tightened, Hizb-ut Tahrir (HT) has been blamed, and the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization (CSTO) has developed a crisis plan in response to the threat 
of future terrorist attacks. (1) In Tajikistan, the former director of the Tajik Agency 
for Drug Control was arrested in a move that some view as politically motivated. 
On the other hand, as Kazakhstan prepares for its 19 September parliamentary 
elections, a recent poll suggests that most parties have a nearly equal chance of 
winning. 
 
Responding to the Suicide Bombings in Uzbekistan 
Leading up to the 31 August celebration of Uzbekistan’s Independence Day, 
Deputy Interior Minister Zukhriddin Bobokalonov has said that security would be 
tightened in response to the 30 July suicide bombings at the U.S. Embassy, 
Israeli Embassy, and the Uzbek prosecutor-general’s office. (2) As the 
investigation into the bombings continues, Uzbek Prosecutor-General Rashitzhon 
Kadyrov informed reporters that the identities of the suicide bombers have been 
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established, though in the interest of the investigation, only vague descriptions 
have been made public. (3) Uzbek officials also revealed that the materials used 
in the bombings contained foreign-made explosive devices. (4) 
 
At least 85 have been arrested as suspects in connection with the suicide 
bombings and Uzbek President Islam Karimov has blamed HT for the July 
bombings as well as those of late March 2004. (5) HT representatives in London 
issued a statement denying involvement in the explosions, attesting their support 
for change through nonviolent means. Karimov responded to this claim by 
asking, "If the religious movement [HT] intends to set up a caliphate in 
Uzbekistan, overthrow the current system, give up the modern style of life and 
create as state based on shari’a law, then how will they be able to do this in a 
peaceful way?" (6) In an effort to enlist the nation in the fight against terrorism, 
Karimov asked all Uzbeks to provide information: "You should protect not only 
your house but also your homeland from disasters. I believe that taking into 
account how dangerous present-day life is, [the Uzbek people] will always be 
alert and vigilant and turn this into a rule of life." (7) 
 
Fearing the potential spread of terrorism, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry circulated 
a press release stating that "Kazakhstan confirms that it is ready to unite efforts 
with Uzbekistan in fighting international terrorism and regional extremism in order 
to strengthen security in Central Asia." (8) Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov described the threat of further terrorist attacks in Central Asia as real and 
"the situation is stable there, but it is not easy." (9) The CSTO has drafted a crisis 
management plan for the use of its rapid deployment forces and has reached an 
agreement with NATO to cooperate in fighting international terrorism. (10) 
According to CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, "there is no real 
military threat [to Central Asia] or a threat of the situation destabilizing. On the 
other hand, there are tendencies that concern us [such as the recent bombings in 
Uzbekistan.]" (11) 
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Arrest of Drug Control Agency Head in Tajikistan 
On 6 August, Lieutenant General Ghaffor Mirzoyev, former head of the Tajik 
Drug Control Agency, was taken into custody. Charges to be brought against 
Mirzoyev include tax evasion, abuse of power, possession of illegal weapons, 
and murder. (12) Tajik Prosecutor General Bobodzhon Bobokhonov told 
reporters that the authorities uncovered machine guns, grenade launchers, 
explosives, antipersonnel mines as well as over 6000 sets of military clothing at a 
meat processing plant which Mirzoyev had privatized. Other charges include the 
misappropriation of U.S. $650,000 and 350 hectares of land during his tenure as 
Commander of the Presidential Guards (from 1995-2004) and in connection with 
the 1998 killing of a district chief of police. (13) 
 
Some political observers fear that the arrest of Mirzoyev was politically 
motivated, with Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov seeking to remove political 
rivals prior to the scheduled 2005 parliamentary elections and 2006 presidential 
elections. (14) 
 
Preparation for Parliamentary Elections in Kazakhstan Continues 
As Kazakhstan prepares for its 19 September parliamentary elections, a recent 
opinion poll conducted by the Kazakh National Association of Sociologists and 
Political Scientists "assessed the parties’ resource potential for winning seats in 
parliament [and] according to the respondents, the parties have more or less 
equal chances of winning voters’ support." (15) According to the poll, 57.5 
percent of voters intend to cast their votes for the Otan (Motherland) party 
(founded by Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev) or the Asar (Mutual Help) 
party (headed by Nazarbayev’s oldest daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva). Otan 
received the highest rating of trust (19.4 percent) with Asar coming in second at 
17.3 percent. The Ak Zhol party received a trust rating of 6.1 percent, the 
Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan received 4.1 percent, and the Communist 
Party of Kazakhstan received 3.2 percent. (16) 
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Source Notes: 
 
(1) For more on the 30 July suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, see NIS Observed, 
4 Aug 04 via www.bu.edu/iscip. The CSTO member states are: Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. 
(2) Interfax, 1341 GMT, 9 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0809 via WNC. 
(3) The individual responsible for bombing the Israeli Embassy was a "30-35 
year-old man of an eastern race"; that of the U.S. Embassy was a "35-40 year-
old man also of an eastern race". The bomber of the prosecutor-general’s office 
has proven more difficult to identify because only fragments remain. ITAR-TASS, 
0821 GMT, 9 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0809 via WNC. 
(4) ITAR-TASS, 0704 GMT, 9 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0809 via WNC. 
(5) For more on the 28 March-1 April bombings in Uzbekistan, see NIS 
Observed, 8 Apr 04; 28 Apr 04 via www.bu.edu/iscip. Officially, 47 were killed in 
the bombings: 33 alleged terrorists, 10 police officers, and four civilians. The trial 
for 15 accused of being involved in the March bombings began on 2 August but 
has been suspended as the investigation of the July bombings continues. 
(6) Eurasianet, 2 Aug 04 via www.eurasianet.org . 
(7) Eurasianet, 2 Aug 04 via www.eurasianet.org . 
(8) Interfax-Kazakhstan (Almaty), 0511 GMT, 5 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0805 
via WNC. 
(9) ITAR-TASS, 1501 GMT, 4 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0804 via WNC. 
(10) Interfax, 1040 GMT, 4 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV02004-0804; AKIpress (Bishkek), 
1038 GMT, 6 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0806 via WNC. 
(11) Interfax, 0830 GMT, 10 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0810 via WNC. 
(12) Eurasianet, 9 Aug 04 via www.eurasianet.org . 
(13) ITAR-TASS, 0639 GMT, 10 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0810 via WNC. 
(14) Eurasianet, 9 Aug 04 via www.eurasianet.org . 
(15) Interfax-Kazakhstan (Almaty), 1037 GMT, 5 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0805 
via WNC. 
(16) ITAR-TASS, 1203 GMT, 10 Aug 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0810 via WNC. 
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